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Introduction 
"We have done a great deal of work, analysis, and even soul searching 
over this proposal before you.  We stand here as your board and very confidently 
tell you that this is an extremely good and fair offer. We are confident that it is in 
the best interests of Great Lakes Cooperative's members, employees, 
communities, and customers to approve this proposal."  Board President, Great 
Lakes Cooperative 
In early 2007, Great Lakes Cooperative's (hereafter GLC) board of 
directors and CEO held meetings with its membership to lay out the terms of a 
merger agreement with—a sale to, rather—Green Plains Renewable Energy 
(hereafter GPRE).  The agreement was the result of months of discussions 
between representatives from GLC, a farmer-owned grain and farm supply 
cooperative, and GPRE, an investor-owned ethanol producer. What would 
ultimately lead to the merger of the two companies began as discussions about 
grain origination for GPRE's ethanol plant.   
The ethanol industry was in its infancy in Iowa during this time, but was 
changing rapidly.  GLC's members encouraged the board and management to find 
a way to engage in this growth with the hopes of securing margins for their grain.  
GPRE had just announced it was building an ethanol plant in GLC's territory near 
Superior, Iowa, and GLC itself had months prior conducted feasibility studies of 
building an ethanol plant.  GLC's goal was to be the grain origination for the 
plant.  Origination contracts, joint ventures, and other coordination agreements 
were considered.  It was after months of discussions that GPRE’s purchase offer 
was born. 
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In the early 2000s, many agribusinesses were consolidating to take 
advantage of scale economies through reduced fixed and operational costs, to 
attract and retain quality employees, and to continue to provide products that 
suited member needs. USDA (2000, 2002) data during this period indicate the 
national number of centralized agricultural cooperatives declined by 
approximately one per week. This pace followed the trend common among 
agribusinesses at the time. The decision-making mechanisms and distribution of 
financial benefits from these mergers depended upon how the firms were 
organized. This case illustrates the differences in these mechanisms between 
member-owned cooperatives and investor-owned firms. 
Background 
GLC was formed in 2001 and was the merger of two centralized 
agricultural cooperatives, Farmer’s Cooperative Elevator Company of Everly (FC 
Everly) and Superior Cooperative Elevator Company (Superior).  GLC offered 
traditional products to its members, including grain storage and marketing 
services, animal feed, and agronomy (bulk fertilizer sales, seed, and crop 
protectants) and petroleum (fuel, lubricants, etc.) products. The two antecedent 
cooperatives differed in the composition of sales, with the one having about 3 
times the petroleum and feed sales of the other, and one having about 1.5 times 
the volume of agronomy product sales of the other. Both had similar grain sales 
volumes. The merger to form GLC provided shared grain storage facilities on 
major and short line railways. 
GPRE began operations in August, 2007 in Shenandoah, Iowa.  Shortly 
thereafter, it purchased the assets of Superior Energy in August, 2008, bringing 
GPRE into the operating territory of GLC.  A third plant was purchased in 
Tennessee in 2008, two were purchased in central Nebraska in mid-2009, and 
several others have been purchased since. According to their website, GPRE in 
2017 was the second largest ethanol producer in the world.  
Conceptual Framework: Contrasting the Cooperative and Investor Business 
Models 
Cooperatives 
A cooperative is a special form of a corporation.  Cooperatives like GLC 
operate under an open membership model where producers can join at any time 
for a nominal investment. The purchase price for common stock, which grants 
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voting rights, in open cooperatives commonly varies between $25 and $1,000. 
Unlike in investor-owned firms, the profit distribution in a cooperative is not 
based on ownership (equity), but rather the amount of business (patronage) 
transacted with the cooperative during the year.  This practice creates the situation 
where governance of the cooperative—control—is not tied to equity.  As such, 
there is little pecuniary value in owning cooperative equity and no tradeable 
market for its value.  For that reason, the cooperative creates an internal system to 
redeem previously issued equity at face value on a systematic basis, which creates 
a system of revolving equity.  Because they do not—and cannot in most cases—
acquire equity through direct investment, and because of the need to re-invest in 
infrastructure, in profitable years cooperatives distribute a portion of profits to 
members in cash and a portion in equity allocated to members. The equity 
allocated in one year is redeemed and paid to the member at a future date 
determined by the cooperative’s board of directors. Thus, a member’s ownership 
in their cooperative comes primarily from profits allocated to them in the form of 
equity, which happens through use, not passive investment.  This equity does not 
appreciate and it has no liquidity since members must wait for the cooperative to 
redeem it at a later date.  
In addition to revolving equity, cooperatives also have unallocated 
retained earnings.  This unallocated equity is primarily created by retaining the 
profits from nonmember business.  A cooperative may also decide to retain a 
portion of member profits as unallocated retained earnings to build a reserve of 
permanent equity that does not need to be revolved (paid out) at a later date.  
While similar from an accounting standpoint to retained earnings in an investor 
owned corporation, unallocated equity has unique implications in a cooperative.  
While the members collectively have a claim to the retained earnings, an inactive 
or retired member will eventually have their entire amount of allocated equity 
redeemed and thus have no remaining ownership in the cooperative.  They 
therefore essentially leave behind their claim to the unallocated equity after they 
stop using the cooperative.  This practice has been termed the “imperfect property 
rights” of cooperative equity.  Unallocated equity (retained earnings) allows a 
cooperative to avoid writing down the value of the allocated equity if they 
experience a loss. However, excessive amounts of unallocated equity may create 
the incentive, particularly among members using the cooperative over short time 
horizons, to liquidate the cooperative to capture their share of the unallocated 
equity. 
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Allocated and unallocated equity, along with the nominal membership 
stock, make up a cooperative’s equity; however, only the unallocated portion is 
permanent equity capital.  Unlike firms whose stock is tradable and marketable, 
there is no transparent and market-based mechanism for understanding the value 
of a cooperative’s equity.  It is not a tradeable security and does not appreciate or 
depreciate except through annual profits, but not through changing economic 
conditions or market signals.  In this way, the members’ value of equity is often 
tied to the value they place on transacting with the cooperative and to its provision 
of goods, services, and competition in the marketplace that benefits its members. 
Cooperatives have a distinct governance structure. The cooperative 
principles require that owners of the cooperative, and its users, belong to the same 
group. Hence, the interests of the users are closely reflected in how the firm is 
run. Most open membership cooperatives use a one-member, one-vote system; 
members exercise control over the cooperative democratically, not based on 
equity ownership.  This situation is in contrast to investor-owned firms where 
control is in proportion to ownership.  In an investor owned firm, minority owners 
often effectively have no control.  Under the cooperative model, there are no 
minority interests since every member has an equal vote.  The cooperative model 
also differs in that directors must be members of the cooperative and therefore an 
agricultural producer.  While this difference brings the customer viewpoint into 
the boardroom, it limits the diversity and background of the board of directors.  It 
also brings a dual sense of accountability. The directors are users of the firm’s 
services, but they are also peers of the membership and perceive the consequences 
of their decisions as a reflection of stewardship. 
Cooperative board members typically receive only nominal compensation.  
In contrast, on the boards in investor-owned corporations, board members can be 
recruited on the basis of specific expertise and often receive substantial 
compensation.  That a cooperative board is limited to agricultural producers may 
place it at a disadvantage when the cooperative is considering expanding into 
other business sectors.  The board delegates operations functions and oversight to 
the CEO, if there is one. The board monitors the operations of the cooperative 
through regular interactions with the CEO and requests for reports on corporate 
conditions. 
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Investor-owned Firms 
An investor owned corporation, such as GPRE, is owned by shareholders 
who generally have no market transactions with the firm.  The common stock of 
many corporations, such as GPRE, is publicly traded, which implies investors can 
buy and sell their shares at any time at the current market price.  The profits in 
investor owned corporations are distributed in proportion to ownership, which can 
be done directly by paying dividends on each share of stock.  Alternatively, the 
firm can reinvest the profits in the business, which usually causes the market price 
for the stock to increase.  The equity in a publicly traded investor owned 
corporation is therefore liquid, (can be bought or sold at any time) and has the 
potential to appreciate.  The value, or at least the market’s collective view on the 
value of a publicly held investor owned corporation can be inferred at any time 
from the current stock price. 
The governance structure of investor-owned firms reflects the interests of 
equity owners. Both publicly and privately held firms allocate voting on major 
questions proportionally based on equity ownership. When common stock is held 
by a minority of shareholders, voting control is effectively concentrated within 
this group. The members have incentives to clearly state their preferences over the 
firms’ operations since they are the owners bearing the most ownership risk and 
will receive the greatest share of benefits accompanying financial success. 
Minority owners often effectively have no control.  Directors in these firms are 
nominated by the general management of the firm or by incumbent directors. The 
background of these candidates is usually valuable to the firm in terms of the 
financial capital or entrepreneurial capacity the individual can provide. The 
candidates need not be stockholders and may even be employees of the firm. This 
method is intended to bring toughminded business judgement skills into the 
boardroom and can limit access to the customer perspective. Board accountability 
to outside groups, then, typically comes in form of director candidates with no 
direct relationship to the firm. As in the case of cooperative directors, most 
investor-owned firm directors focus their energies on monitoring and supervising 
the CEO, suggesting that directors of both types of organizations focus on 
reacting to internal, short-term problems. 
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The GPRE Offer to Purchase GLC 
Iowa was in the midst of an ethanol production boom in the early 2000s. 
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2017), Iowa produced 
10.5 million barrels of fuel ethanol in 2001; by 2008, it produced 56.1 million 
barrels, an average year-over-year production capacity growth rate of 28 percent. 
Nationally, 707 million bushels of corn were used for ethanol production in the 
2001-2002 marketing year, and 3.1 billion bushels were used in the 2007-2008 
marketing year. Much of the increased corn production to supply ethanol 
happened in Iowa. The 2002 agricultural census indicates 1.9 billion bushels of 
corn were produced, increasing to 2.3 billion bushels in the 2007 census. 
Ethanol producers participate in several, distinct, supply chains. Ethanol is 
derived from corn or other biomass as a feedstock, but the availability and 
carbohydrate-rich nature of corn make it the preferred feedstock. Corn is 
merchandised through country elevators or imported. Costly transportation of 
corn leads to only a handful of country elevators being present in any one corn 
producing area, but corn is otherwise available for import throughout the world. 
Records available from GLC at the time of the proposed merger indicate grain 
sales were approximately 70 percent of revenue. Once produced, ethanol is 
typically blended with gasoline and sold to consumers, making fuel blenders and 
refiners, a highly concentrated market, the primary customers of these firms. GLC 
was a retailer of petroleum products and was interested in installing E-85 pumps 
in its retail locations. Ethanol production generates distiller’s grains as a 
byproduct. These are sold to beef and dairy cattle operations as a feed ration 
ingredient. Sales occur at lowest cost when dried and transported to nearby 
farmers, a market with low concentration. GLC had significant feed sales at the 
time of the merger.  
The GLC board spent several months studying ways it could participate in 
the growing ethanol market and was conscious this would change the 
merchandising, and perhaps the originating opportunities available to the 
cooperative, not to mention its influence on attracting and retaining quality 
employees. The board had studied joint venture possibilities for ethanol 
production and the development of a new generation cooperative as authorized by 
the recently passed section (501a) to the Iowa Cooperative Associations statute. 
This statute allows non-producer members to contribute equity to the cooperative, 
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receive—up to a maximum share—net income from the cooperative, and have 
limited voting rights. 
The GLC board also spent time learning how it and its producer members 
should form governance structures in future relationships with other firms. By 
2008, GLC had just exited an origination agreement with New Fashion Pork. 
Corn forms an ingredient in the feed rations of pigs. Large pork processors, such 
as Smithfield, had increased the fraction of corn purchased directly from farmers 
and cancelled contracts with grain merchandisers such as Archer Daniels Midland 
and CHS, the nation’s largest farmer owned cooperative. The CEO of GLC 
reported to the membership that “we had … experienced the problems that can 
arise in … a contract if not constructed correctly or both parties are not on the 
same page,” and that it would be difficult to write a grain origination contract 
with an “I’ll trust you, you trust me” philosophy.  
These efforts occurred in the context of, what the board chairman 
described, the cooperative “finally beginning to jell into what it always had the 
potential to be.” GLC approached the merger discussions under the leadership of 
its second CEO since the merger and the fourth CEO many directors from the 
former Everly Cooperative had known in the past ten years. The board 
chairmanship had not changed since the Everly-Superior merger seven years 
prior. 
In August, 2005, Superior Energy, another ethanol producer, announced it 
had acquired land for construction of ethanol production adjacent to GLC’s 
Superior, Iowa facility. This facility required corn as an input, and representatives 
of Superior Energy, later purchased by GPRE, interacted with GLC over the next 
three years to discuss plans Superior Energy, and later GPRE, had to purchase 
corn from GLC. The board president of GLC at the time indicated representatives 
of GPRE initially claimed “they had little interest in working closely with” GLC. 
Over the course of multiple discussions between GLC’s directors and 
management and representatives of GPRE, both groups learned about each other’s 
scope of business in the grain origination, fuel marketing, and animal feed 
businesses. These discussions included introducing E-85 fuel pumps, that blend 
ethanol and gasoline, at GLC retail locations, making the cooperative one of the 
first to provide this type of fuel. GPRE and GLC representatives also discussed 
farmer-member incentives for planting corn varieties that enhanced ethanol yield 
during the refining process. 
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One evening during these discussions, two representatives of GPRE 
visited with the CEO of GLC and asked if he and the board would ever consider 
selling the cooperative. “The Superior facility?,” the CEO asked. “No. We mean 
the whole thing.” The CEO repeated the question to the board. The board 
requested an offer from GPRE and hired private consultants to consider several 
dimensions in order to evaluate the bid. These included an attorney, a grain 
appraiser, a real estate appraiser, and accountants to review the cash flow of the 
cooperative and how potential payouts of equity from a merger would compare to 
historical situations in which a cooperative had been merged into another type of 
firm. 
GPRE offered GLC members $12.5 million in cash for their equity in the 
cooperative, equal to 101 percent of the cooperative’s equity. It also offered 
shares of GPRE stock, amounting to 7.1 percent of its company offering. For 
individual GLC members, this meant they would receive a combination of cash 
and GPRE stock after the merger. For example, a member with $200 in common 
stock and $9800 in preferred stock (obtained as deferred allocated patronage 
income), would receive under the agreement $10,100 in cash and approximately 
400 shares of GPRE stock. GPRE would also assume the liabilities for the 
existing employee pension program. The total value of the bid was approximately 
$30 million. The balance of the cooperative’s investments in other cooperatives, 
redeemed only through equity retirements at a time selected by the boards of the 
respective cooperatives, would be put into an escrow account. Members would 
have a share in the proceeds of these investments, valued at $10.4 million, as the 
associated equity was redeemed by their respective cooperatives. 
During member meetings leading up to the merger vote, boards and 
management of both companies laid out the common interests both companies 
share in fuel, feed, agronomy, and grain.  They also made the case that "buying 
the same bushel of corn twice"—once by the co-op and then by the ethanol 
plant—ultimately eroded value to the producer.  As members considered the 
offer, they noted the cooperative had made cash payments of patronage 
historically, and was currently retiring equity allocated to the members as retained 
net income from earnings 25 years prior. 
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Advantages and Disadvantages to Accepting the GPRE Offer 
The differences between the cooperative and investor owned firm 
governance and capital structures highlight the advantages and disadvantages of 
GLC accepting the offer from GPRE.  The ownership rights farmers have in 
cooperatives have value to the extent that enough capital—generated through 
retained profits—is put into the business to ensure it will continue to generate 
income.  Farmers extract the benefits of ownership not through ownership alone, 
but also through patronizing the cooperative and through participating in the 
decision-making of the firm. Farmers are expected to regularly participate in the 
decision making of the cooperative so as to indicate what benefits they are willing 
to sustain through patronage. 
GPRE owners have similar, income-related, interests. However 
uncertainty exists between grain and ethanol producers given the possibility that 
grain producers might renege upon a prior agreement to deliver grain feedstocks 
to an ethanol plant at an agreed upon price and delivery schedule due to 
unexpectedly higher spot prices. Furthermore, the Iowa region during the time 
period of this case can be characterized by a large number of potential grain 
producers and merchandisers with which to transact, making the consequences of 
any one merchandiser acting opportunistically against the ethanol firm significant. 
Liquidating the cooperative would provide a financial return to GLC 
members. Under the conditions of the GPRE offer, members would get a cash 
payment roughly equal to their allocated equity.  The present value of the 
allocated equity is obviously less than its face value since it will not be redeemed 
until a future date, and the average equity redemption time among Iowa’s 
cooperatives at that time was approximately 15 years, suggesting that equity is 
redeemed approximately 15 years after the year in which it is allocated.  The 
members would clearly gain the difference between the present value and face 
value of their revolving equity.  The members also receive 400 shares of GPRE 
stock which they can either sell or hold.  In the long run, receipt of GPRE stock 
provides incentives to grain producers to protect the financial wellbeing of the 
firm. More immediately, however, GPRE stock represents a payment in excess of 
the value of their allocated equity.   
If only the allocated equity is considered, the GPRE offer is attractive.  On 
the other hand, by liquidating the cooperative, the GLC members are also giving 
Journal of Cooperatives 
 
56 
up a stream of future cash patronage and future equity redemption payments on 
equity issued in subsequent years. Research suggests that the present value of a 
cooperative’s future patronage stream to members is often worth 3-5 times the 
value of the allocated equity.  When future patronage is considered, the GLC 
members may be losing in accepting the GPRE offer.  Of course in considering 
that future benefit stream, the GLC members would have to consider their 
projections for the cooperative’s future profits and patronage. The presence of 
GPRE in the market place would have to be considered when projecting future 
patronage. Additionally, a member with a short time horizon of cooperative use, 
such as an older member, would value future patronage differently relative to a 
younger member. 
The GPRE offer could also be compared from a portfolio perspective.  A 
GLC member’s investment in their cooperative is essentially an extension of their 
farm business.  From a portfolio standpoint their investment in their farm 
operation and cooperative lacks diversification. When corn production becomes 
unprofitable, it is likely that firms that supply inputs to corn farmers and market 
their grain, also fair poorly.  If the GLC members accepted the GPRE offer, they 
would have the opportunity to invest the proceeds in stocks in unrelated 
industries.  If they choose to hold on to the GPRE stock that they obtain from the 
deal, that stock also diversifies their total investment.  One would expect ethanol 
companies that use corn to fare well when corn prices are low and less well in 
times of high corn prices. Therefore, ethanol profits could be countercyclical with 
corn production profits. 
GLC members would also want to consider whether the presence, or 
absence, of GLC might have implications for the producers’ future grain 
marketing transactions.  As a cooperative, GLC would consider grain pricing 
decisions under the joint objectives of how they impact the farm members and 
how they impact the cooperative. Even when they have market power, 
cooperatives have no incentive to purchase grain below market price since they 
will turn around and distribute the resulting profits to the same members that 
made the transaction.  As an investor owned corporation, GPRE would have a 
single objective of maximizing the shareholders’ return.  If GPRE obtained a 
dominant footprint in the market such that they could lower the price paid for 
corn, one would clearly expect them to do so.  In an extreme case, if GPRE found 
that they could source corn internationally at a cheaper price leaving the Iowa 
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producers without a market, that again would be a simple decision guided by the 
objective of maximizing the investor returns.  In short, in deciding whether to 
dissolve their cooperative the GLC members would need to consider whether the 
cooperative was playing or could play a role in the future in keeping the grain 
market competitive. 
Questions for reflection 
1. What are the board’s roles and responsibilities in bringing an offer to 
dissolve the cooperative to a vote of the membership?  Ultimately it will be a 
member decision but many members may infer that, since the board brought the 
decision to a vote, they conclude it is in the members’ best interests.  Since the 
board was elected by the members to protect the long term viability of the 
cooperative, are they violating their duty by facilitating a possible vote for 
dissolution? 
2. How should the value of a cooperative be measured?  Is it by the current 
equity value, its stream of future benefits, or by some other measure? 
3. GLC, like many agricultural cooperatives operates on a one member-one 
vote system.  This system means that a member who has a low lever or equity and 
a low portion of the cooperative’s business has the same vote as the largest 
producer and the largest equity holder.  Cooperatives can use an alternative voting 
system with votes in proportion to patronage.  In this situation, do you think the 
average member is better or worse off under the one member-one vote system? 
4. When local grain cooperatives were established in Iowa, grain markets 
were not well developed and the railroads exercised market power.  Do 
cooperatives like GLC still have a roll in keeping markets competitive and should 
the board and membership consider that factor in this decision? 
5. Individual cooperative members have specific ownership of their allocated 
equity because it is held in their name and their annual balances are 
communicated to them.  They also have a collective interest in the unallocated 
retained earnings.  The unallocated retained earnings amount in GLC is roughly 
50% of total equity.  That means that an offer of 100% of allocated equity is 50% 
of total equity.  In what ways does a cooperative’s decision to retain funds as 
allocated or unallocated equity affect member’s decisions when they evaluate an 
offer to sell the cooperative? 
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